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To that degree, at the very least, the clarity supplied by Barlow
Clowes is indeed to be welcomed.
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Introduction
The right to daylight exists in English Law as a type of easement
which can be enjoyed in favour of a window, or other aperture in a
building designed to admit light.1 It has been settled law since the
House of Lords’ decision in Colls v Home & Colonial Stores Ltd2
that a right to light does not protect all the light then enjoyed
by an aperture. It simply provides an entitlement to receive a
certain minimum quantity of light. This was described by Lord
Lindley as an entitlement to ‘‘sufficient light’’ for the comfortable
or beneficial use of the dominant tenement, ‘‘according to the
ordinary notions of mankind’’.3
Since Colls the courts have struggled with two related issues.
The first is how, in practice, to measure a sufficiency of light
according to ordinary notions of mankind. The second, in cases
where light has been found to be insufficient, concerns the
principles to be applied when exercising the courts’ discretion
to grant a mandatory injunction, or to award damages in lieu.
Regan v Paul Properties No.1 Ltd addressed both issues.
In considering the question of sufficiency the trial court was
confronted by the second reported challenge to the established
approach to expert evidence in rights to light cases in less
than two years.4 This is of particular interest in the context of
1 Potts v Smith [1868] L.R. 6 Eq. 311; Harris v De Pinna [1886] 33 Ch. D. 238; Levet v Gas
Light & Coke Co [1919] 1 Ch. 24.
2 [1904] A.C. 179.
3 ibid., 208.
4 See also Midtown Ltd v City of London Real Property Co Ltd [2005] EWHC 33, Ch.
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growing academic and professional criticism of the methodologies
on which expert testimony has traditionally been based. Of
more immediate importance, the case also provided the first
opportunity for the Court of Appeal to consider the question of
remedies for an infringement of a right to light in over 20 years.
Its conclusions in this regard contained some particularly harsh,
and unexpected, news for developers.
The facts
The case concerned the impact of a development in Brighton on
the daylight enjoyed by a maisonette on the opposite side of the
road. The development involved raising two existing two- and
three-storey buildings to five storeys. The claimant maintained
that the presence of the development’s penthouse flat would
diminish the light in his living room to below the minimum
required by Colls.
He raised his concerns with the defendants as soon as he
became aware of their proposals. Unfortunately they were acting
on professional advice that had failed to recognise the true extent
of the loss. The defendants therefore proceeded with their devel-
opment for a further five months and were only stopped by the
issue of proceedings and their giving of undertakings in response
to the claimant’s application for a prohibitory injunction. By this
stage the shell of the penthouse flat was already in place and
the interference with the claimant’s light was largely complete.
The claimant therefore sought a mandatory injunction, requiring
the removal of those parts of the penthouse flat, which would
return the levels of daylight in his living room to an acceptable
minimum.
The evidence showed that the claimant would be unable to
use the central portions of the living room for reading owing
to the reduction in daylight caused by the development. This
would require him, either to use electric light for these activities,
or to move into the bay window area at the front of the room
with a consequent lack of privacy from the occupants of the
development across the road. Agreed valuation evidence showed
that the maisonette had been reduced in value by between £5,000
and £5,500 due to the loss of light which had been suffered.
In order to restore the level of daylight required by the claimant
it would be necessary to remove the lounge, one of the bedrooms
and the en-suite bathroom from the penthouse flat. The cost of
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removing the already completed work would be £35,000 and the
value of the flat would be reduced by a further £175,000.
Liability for Infringement of Right to Light
The question of liability, of course, depended on the sufficiency
of the claimant’s remaining light according to the rule in Colls.
The trial court received expert testimony to the effect that the
light was no longer sufficient. This was based on the traditional
methodology, the so-called fifty-fifty rule, first proposed by
Waldram in the 1920s, and still used by surveyors today.5
In simple terms, this proposes that a room receives sufficient
daylight where 0.2 per cent of the sky can be seen from at least
50 per cent of its floor area measured at working plane height.
The trial court heard that 66 per cent of the claimant’s living
room had enjoyed the required level of sky visibility before the
development, and that this had now been reduced to 43.5 per
cent. According to the fifty-fifty rule, the light was therefore
insufficient.
With one notable exception,6 the outcomes of the reported
cases throughout the 20th century suggest that the courts were
happy to follow the conclusions of the expert witnesses when
deciding on questions of liability. More recently the experts’
traditional methodology has been subject to increasing levels
of criticism, both from academic writers and from within the
experts’ own professional institutions.7
There is also evidence that litigants and their legal represen-
tatives are now willing to question the relevance of the expert
evidence on which rights to light cases have previously been
decided. For example, defence counsel in the recent case of Mid-
town Ltd v City of London Real Property Co Ltd had argued that
it was now time ‘‘to dispense with rigid and unhelpful rules that
had been devised in the past, such as the fifty-fifty rule’’.8
Significantly, the continuing relevance of the fifty-fifty rule
was also challenged by the defendants’ counsel in the present
case.9 He maintained that it was not a rule of law, and that other
factors were more relevant in deciding whether the claimant had
5 See S. Bickford-Smith, and A. Francis, Rights of Light: The Modern Law (2000), Ch.12.
6 Ough v King [1967] 1 W.L.R. 1547.
7 See www.rightstolight.com.
8 [2005] EWHC 33 at [59].
9 [2006] EWHC 1941 at [52] and [67]–[69].
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actually suffered any injury. Stephen Smith Q.C. (sitting as a
deputy judge of the High Court) agreed that the fifty-fifty rule
was not a rule of law but considered that:
‘‘It is a very useful guide which will apply to the majority of cases
concerning infringements of rights to light, especially where the
dominant tenement is a dwelling house and the room in question
is a living room, but it need not be followed in extraordinary
circumstances.’’10
The learned deputy judge duly applied the fifty-fifty rule when
making his decision on liability. Describing the 66 per cent floor
area with 0.2 per cent sky visibility before the development
as ‘‘significantly more than the conventional minimum’’ and
the 43.5 per cent after the development as ‘‘significantly less
than the conventional minimum’’ he concluded that ‘‘on a




Having found in the claimant’s favour on liability the learned
deputy judge then considered whether a mandatory injunction
would be an appropriate remedy, or whether he should instead
award damages in lieu. This was a matter for the discretion of the
court under s.50 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The exercise of
this discretion in rights to light cases is subject to conflicting
judicial pronouncements regarding the appropriateness of an
award of damages.
The leading case is, of course, Shelfer v City of London Electric
Lighting Co12 where the Court of Appeal imposed an injunction to
restrain a nuisance caused by noise and vibration. The judgments
leave no doubt that an award of damages will rarely be an
appropriate remedy in cases involving a continuing actionable
nuisance and A. L. Smith L.J. proposed his ‘‘good working rule’’
that damages would only be an appropriate remedy:
• if the injury to the plaintiff’s legal rights is small;
• and is one which is capable of being estimated in money;
10 ibid., [67].
11 ibid., [71].
12 [1895] 1 Ch. 287.
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• and is one which can be adequately compensated by a small
money payment;
• and the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the
defendant to grant an injunction.13
A different approach in rights to light cases?
Despite the clarity of the Shelfer principles a number of
subsequent judgments had suggested that they could be relaxed
in rights to light cases where an award of damages might often
be most appropriate. The most influential of these was Lord
Macnaghten’s judgment in Colls where he said obiter that:
‘‘if there is really a question as to whether the obstruction is legal or
not, and if the defendant has acted fairly and not in an unneighbourly
spirit, I am disposed to think that the Court ought to incline to
damages rather than to an injunction.’’14
This was immediately followed by the decision in Jolly v Kine,15
where the Court of Appeal refused an injunction in a rights to
light case and awarded damages. The Court was clearly of the
view that a less restrictive approach should now be taken from
that advocated in Shelfer and this is apparent from the judgment
of Cozens-Hardy L.J.:
‘‘I think it is impossible to doubt that the tendency of the speeches
in the House of Lords in Colls v Home & Colonial Stores Ltd is to
go a little further than was done in Shelfer v City of London Electric
Lighting Co, and to indicate that as a general rule the Court ought to
be less free in granting mandatory injunctions than it was in years
gone by.’’16
The Court of Appeal again awarded damages in the rights to
light case of Fishenden v Higgs17 and once again sought to
distinguish the approach taken from that proposed in Shelfer.
Maughan L.J. considered that A.L. Smith L.J.’s good working
rule was ‘‘not a universal or even a sound rule in all cases of
injury to light’’ and felt that an interference with a right to light
‘‘differed enormously’’ from injury by noise and vibration.18 Lord
Hanworth summarised the Court’s position when he said:
13 ibid., 322–323.
14 Above fn.2, 193.
15 [1905] 1 Ch. 480.
16 ibid., 504.
17 (1935) 153 L.T. 128.
18 ibid., 144–145.
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‘‘It seems to me, therefore, that these rules in the Shelfer case must
now be taken with the concomitant passages to which I have referred
in the later cases, in Colls and in Jolly v Kine, and that we ought to
incline against an injunction if possible.’’19
Although two subsequently reported rights to light cases20
have applied the Shelfer principles in their pure form (and
granted injunctions) the recent decision in Midtown21 once
again appeared to confirm the courts’ general reluctance to grant
injunctions for infringements of a right to light.
In that case Peter Smith J. did not accept that a victim of
an infringement of light had an entitlement to an injunction,
virtually as of right, and considered that the court instead had to
strike a fair balance after considering all the circumstances of the
case. On this basis, despite a substantial injury to the claimants,
he declined to grant an injunction and instead made an award of
damages.22
Award of damages and appeal
After reviewing these decisions the learned deputy judge in Regan
concluded that it was no longer an exceptional course to refuse
an injunction for the infringement of a right to light and that
the onus was now on the claimant to demonstrate why damages
would not be an appropriate remedy.23
He did not consider that there was anything in the defendants’
conduct that would disentitle them from asking for an award of
damages in lieu of an injunction as they had acted throughout on
the advice of their surveyor.24
In the absence of oppressive or high-handed conduct by the
defendants he therefore awarded damages in lieu of an injunction.
Somewhat ironically, in view of his earlier comments, he also
justified the decision by reference to the four Shelfer criteria
which, he concluded, had all been satisfied.25
His conclusions in this regard emphasised the smallness of
the claimant’s injury compared to the cost to the defendants
of complying with an injunction. One third of the claimant’s
19 ibid., 139.
20 Pugh v Howells [1984] 48 P. & C.R. 298; and Deakins v Hookings [1994] 1 E.G.L.R. 190.
21 Above fn.4.
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living room remained well lit and the room had not, therefore,
been rendered uninhabitable. The loss of value to the claimant’s
maisonette (a maximum of £5,500) was also small when compared
to the loss of floor area, and its effect on the likely selling price
of the defendant’s penthouse flat. This would be disproportionate
to the amount of harm caused to the claimant.
The claimant duly appealed to the Court of Appeal against the
refusal to grant an injunction. His grounds of appeal were that
the learned deputy judge had misdirected himself in law in ruling
that an award of damages was not an exceptional course, and in
placing the burden of proof on a claimant to persuade the court
that damages were not an appropriate remedy. Furthermore, he
maintained that the learned deputy judge had also incorrectly
applied the Shelfer principles to the facts of the case.26
Decision in the court of appeal
Relevant principles
The Court of Appeal’s judgment was delivered by Mummery L.J.
He noted that Shelfer was a Court of Appeal case that was binding
on the Court in the present case.27 He did not accept Cozens-
Hardy L.J.’s conclusions in Jolly v Kine about the tendency of the
speeches in the House of Lords in Colls to go further than was
done in Shelfer. Any such ‘‘tendency’’ was only evident in the
obiter remarks in Lord Macnaghten’s speech. Lord Macnaghten
had described his comments as ‘‘practical suggestions’’ and had
expressly stated in his judgment that he did not intend them to
be authoritative.28
On this basis his lordship concluded that some of the later
cases had treated Lord Macnaghten’s observations ‘‘as having an
effect which they did not, and were never intended, to have.’’29
He considered that Fishenden v Higgs and Hill also came into
this category and concluded that the learned deputy judge had
‘‘gone too far’’ in treating it as authority for placing the onus on
a claimant to persuade a court that he should not be left with a
remedy in damages.30
26 [2006] EWCA Civ 1319 at [26] and [33].
27 [35].
28 [39] and [46].
29 [39].
30 [57].
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His lordship also made reference to the judgments in the Court
of Appeal in Slack v Leeds Industrial Cooperative Society Ltd.31
Although the learned deputy judge had not discussed these, they
also provided a reaffirmation of the Shelfer principles.
Findings
Based on these authorities the Court of Appeal held that the
learned deputy judge had acted on a wrong principle of law
in placing the onus on the claimant to show why damages
should not be awarded. It therefore exercised the trial court’s
discretion afresh and granted the mandatory injunction sought
by the claimant.32
In doing so his lordship made reference to the Shelfer principles.
He did not regard the claimant’s loss, which involved a substantial
interference with the use of his living room, as ‘‘a small injury’’.
The learned deputy judge’s remarks about the room not being
rendered uninhabitable indicated that he had not taken the
correct approach in relation to the size of the injury.33
Although he accepted that the injury was capable of being
estimated in money he did not think that it could be compensated
by a small monetary payment. There were different ways of
calculating the loss. A money payment calculated according to
the principles of equitable compensation, and therefore based
on a proportion of the developer’s net profit, would not be
small. The learned deputy judge had also been wrong to link
his consideration of this issue with the comparative cost to the
defendants of complying with an injunction.34
Finally, in view of the conduct of each of the parties, his
lordship did not consider that it would be oppressive to the
defendants to grant an injunction. The claimant had objected to
the development as soon as he became aware of it. In the face
of this objection the defendants had chosen to take ‘‘a calculated
risk’’ and to continue with the construction operations ‘‘with
their eyes open’’. Although they had acted on the advice of their
surveyor, this advice turned out to be wrong. The defendants must
take the consequences of this rather than throwing them onto
the claimant in order to deny him his prima facie entitlement to
an injunction.35
31 [1924] 2 Ch. 475.
32 [69].
33 [70].
34 [71] and [72].
35 [73]–[75].
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Conclusions
The decisions, both at first instance on liability, and in the Court
of Appeal on the grant of an injunction, represent an adherence
to textbook orthodoxy. The continued reliance on the fifty-fifty
rule is probably unsurprising. Despite growing criticisms of the
technique it has provided a useful rule of thumb for the courts in
rights to light cases for over 80 years. Although other techniques
have been proposed, they remain undeveloped and any alternative
will take time to gain widespread acceptance. In the meantime,
whatever its undoubted flaws, the fifty-fifty rule continues to
provide the courts with a welcome element of certainly in the
highly uncertain process of determining sufficiency of daylight
according to the rule in Colls.
The Court of Appeal’s decision on the granting of the
mandatory injunction has more immediate consequences.
Although it is difficult to fault the reasoning behind it on doctrinal
grounds it is equally difficult to question the learned deputy’s
judge’s observations during the trial that, in practice, mandatory
injunctions have been a rare event in rights to light cases. Indeed,
the courts’ preference for awarding damages, even in the most
extreme circumstances, seemed to have reached its apogee in the
Midtown decision.
Nevertheless, despite the practical realities of the situation,
Lord Macnaghten’s observations had been allowed to sit uneasily
alongside A. L. Smith L.J.’s good working rule for over a
century without apparently challenging its essential tenets.
To a large extent, the learned deputy judge’s decision simply
reflected established practice in rights to light cases. However, by
expressing it as a decision based on a reversal of the established
burden of proof, he forced the Court of Appeal to make a choice
between the statement of law in Shelfer and that in Colls. In
doing so it chose to reaffirm the traditional Shelfer principles
and, theoretically at least, to reverse the courts’ longstanding
developer-friendly approach to remedies in rights to light cases.
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